Introduction
Models of scientific phenomena take a central place in contemporary views of science education (e.g. Gilbert & Boulter, Rutherford, 1998; Raghavan, Satoris, & Glaser, 1998; Schecker, 1993; Stratford, 1997; White & Frederiksen, 1998; Zaraza & Fisher, 1999) . Several authors have argued that the activity of building and revising such models is particularly well suited to provide meaningful learning experiences. For instance, some emphasise the opportunity for students to think scientifically about the behaviour of complex phenomena (e.g. Bliss, 1994; Jackson, Stratford, Krajcik, & Soloway, 1996; Hestenes, 1997; Spector & Davidson, 1997; Verhoeff, Waarlo, & Boersma, 2008; Wild, 1996) . Others state that if students are allowed to construct models themselves, they can not only reflect upon the science content they are supposed to learn, but also upon the nature of their own knowledge (e.g. Hogan & Thomas, 2001; Jonassen, Strobel, & Gottdenker, 2005; Spector, 2000) .
According to this argument, models offer students the means to externalise and to test their own mental representations of particular scientific phenomena (Coon, 1988; Doyle & Ford, 1998; Penner, 2001 ).
However, the benefits of engaging students in modelling activities may only be realised if students understand the nature and the purpose of models in science, as well as comprehend how models are constructed (Justi & Gilbert, 2002; Treagust, Chittleborough, & Mamiala, 2002) . Such understanding may help students in using and in developing models, since it is assumed that students' epistemological understanding about models and the process of modelling is related to how they approach the material and ultimately to what they learn (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Gobert & Discenna 1997; Hammer, 1994; Schwarz & White, 2005; Van Driel & Verloop, 1999) . For instance, Crawford & Cullin (2004) postulated that a weak epistemological understanding may act to constrain students in using and in developing scientific models. In accordance, several authors have argued that students' F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 3 epistemological understanding has an effect on their cognitive processing during modelling (e.g. Hofer, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schwarz, 2002a; Windschnittl & André, 1998) .
Although there is ample evidence to suggest that students' epistemological understanding of models and the process of modelling tends to be quite limited(e.g. Gobert, Snyder, & Houghton, 2002; Grosslight, Unger, Jay, & Smith, 1991; Roth & Roychoudhury, 1994; Ryder & Leach, 1999; Songer & Linn, 1991) , there has been little evidence to demonstrate the direct relation between students' epistemological understanding and the quality of their modelling
processes. If such a relationship could be confirmed, this would lend credibility to efforts aimed at advancing students' epistemological understanding of models and the process of modelling (e.g., Schwarz & White, 2005) . The present study investigates the relationship between students' level of epistemological understanding and the level of their cognitive processing during computer-based scientific modelling.
The epistemological status of models in science
The assessment of students' epistemological understanding will be based on a conceptualisation of how experts perceive models and the process of modelling. Scientists design models with a particular scientific purpose in mind, such as explaining, visualizing, or predicting the behaviour of a scientific phenomenon (Giere, 1990; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, et al., 1998; Justi & Gilbert, 2002; Schwartz & Lederman, 2008) . Models cannot be completely accurate and are almost always tentative, in the sense that they are open to further revision and development (Crawford & Cullin, 2004) . In addition, scientists can hold more than one model for the same phenomenon depending on the context, on the purpose of the scientific research and on the perspective of the scientist. An expressed model is available for other scientists to discuss and to reflect upon. Therefore, scientific enterprise can be conceptualised as a process of comparing and testing competing models (Giere, 1990; Hestenes, 1987; 1997; Penner, 2001 ). Students' epistemological understanding of models and the process of modelling Grosslight et al. (1991) interviewed middle and high school science students and experts' to assess their epistemological understanding of models and modelling in science. The questions aimed to address the following dimensions: kinds of models, purpose of models, designing and creating models, multiple models for the same phenomenon, and changing models. Three general levels of understanding emerged from the interviews: Level 1, which corresponds to a 'naïve realist' epistemology of models and modelling, entails the notion that models are simple copies of reality. Students who hold a Level 1 understanding do not make an ontological distinction between the observable objects and events of the material world and the entities that are created and defined for the purpose of building scientific models. At Level 2, students do realise that there is a specific, explicit purpose that determines the way the model is constructed. These students acknowledge that the modeller makes deliberate choices on how to achieve this purpose. According to a Level 2 understanding, the model does not need to reflect all properties of the real-world phenomenon being modelled. Finally, the experts held a Level 3 understanding, in that they conceived that models are constructed in service of developing and testing ideas rather than replicating reality; that the modeller takes an active role in constructing the model; and that models can be manipulated and subjected to tests in the service of informing ideas and generating predictions. The main characteristic to distinguish Level 2 from Level 3 is that the main focus of a Level 2 conception is still on the model and the reality modelled and not on the ideas portrayed.
Employing this characterisation, Grosslight et al. (1991) found that the majority (67%) of middle school students were at level 1, 12% were at level 2, and 18% reached an understanding that fell in between the levels 1 and 2 (i.e. mixed level). Of the high school students, only 23% had level 1 scores and the rest were split evenly between the mixed level The general trend in these findings has been confirmed in several other studies (cf., Lederman, 1992) . For instance, Treagust et al. (2002) found that a great deal of secondary science students did not understand how models are used in the development of scientific ideas. Most students valued the visual aspect of scientific models, but were not able to reason beyond the descriptive nature of models (cf. Barowy & Roberts, 1999) . However, counter to the findings from Grosslight et al.'s study (1991), Treagust et al. (2002) found that students, in general, do have an understanding that it is possible to have multiple models for the same phenomenon and that each model displays a particular perspective or emphasis. Schwarz & White (2005) found that students' epistemological understanding regarding the creation, evaluation and revision of models was moderate (cf. Spitulnik, Krajcik, & Soloway, 1999) .
This was still the case after students had worked through a curriculum in which they learned about the nature of scientific models and engaged in modelling activities. When they were asked about the relative value of alternative models, for instance, students responded that all models are of equal value. In addition, more than half of the students agreed that model revision occurs when there is new information or evidence available, or when the model is simply wrong.
However, the approach taken by Grosslight et al. (1991) focuses on an epistemology of science at a rather abstract level. The validity of this approach has been questioned, because students epistemological ideas are likely to be context-bound (e.g. Elby & Hammer, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Hogan, 2000; Paulsen & Wells, 1998) . As a consequence, in specific contexts, students may entertain advanced epistemologies without being able to articulate the underlying viewpoints in general. Moreover, a student could provide 'high-level' answers on a generic questionnaire, based on hearsay only. Finally, different contexts make different F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y 6 demands upon students, and some forms of epistemological understanding may be more beneficial to learning in some contexts than in others (Elby & Hammer, 2001; Hogan, 1998; Leach, Millar, Ryder, & Séré, 2000; Schwarz, 2002b) . Therefore, while maintaining the dimensions and levels as defined by Grosslight et al. (1991) , a more legitimate assessment could be achieved if the questions are situated in the concrete problem context at hand.
Studies relating students' epistemological understanding of models and the process of modelling with their cognitive processing
Although many of the studies cited above, conclude suggesting that students' poor epistemological understanding might restrict their cognitive processing during modelling, there is little direct evidence for such a relation. Several authors have provided evidence for a relation between students' epistemological understanding and their performance on general inquiry activities (e.g. Buffler, Allie, Lubben, & Campbell, 2001; Gomes, Borges, & Justi, 2008; Hammer, 1994; Millar, Lubben, Gott, & Duggan, 1994; Purdie, Hattie, & Douglas, 1996; Ryder & Leach, 1999; Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991; Schommer, 1990; Songer & Linn, 1991) . However, as argued above, such findings cannot straightforwardly be generalised across contexts.
Within the field of scientific modelling, there have been only a few studies that attempted to relate students' epistemological understanding to their cognitive processing during modelling. First, Schwarz & White (2005) evaluated a model-centred method to science education, where they taught middle school students on the nature of scientific models and in which students were engaged in the process of modelling. Based on correlational results, including significant correlations between pre-test epistemology scores and post-test scores on an applied physics test, Schwarz & White (2005) conclude that a better epistemological understanding may significantly contribute to the acquisition of modelling skills and physics knowledge. Correspondingly, Gobert & Discenna (1997) found that students who hold a However, both studies were focused at learning outcomes and did not directly observe the students' cognitive processes during their modelling task.
Talsma (2000) took another approach, by inferring students' epistemological and strategic understanding (i.e. understanding of students related to how they define, plan, implement and evaluate modelling activities) from the notes they had taken during the construction of computer models in the domain of ecosystems. She found that most students constructed models with a specific purpose focused on reality (i.e. Level 2). In evaluating their models, students generally commented that they would add more variables, reflecting an epistemological understanding that is characterised by the addition of new information (i.e.
Level 2). Only few students showed a focus on ideas or the testing of possible theories (i.e.
Level 3). Regarding students' strategic understanding, Talsma (2000) found that many students were sufficiently able to define the phenomenon to be addressed by their models. In addition, all students constructed models that could be executed on the computer, but often included redundant relations and variables. However, given that Talsma (2000) inferred students' strategic and epistemological understandings from their modelling processes, this approach is not suitable to test the relation between understanding to process. In fact, none of the above-mentioned studies focused on whether and how students' epistemological understanding is related to their cognitive processing during modelling.
To perform well on an complex and open task, like a computer modelling task, students need to engage in Deep cognitive processing, as described in the work of Marton & Säljö (1976; 1997) , Ramsden (1992) , and Entwistle (1981; 1988; , involves active learning processes, such as relating ideas, looking for patterns and principles and attempting to integrate new information with prior knowledge and experience. Surface cognitive Accordingly, it can be expected that high scores on epistemological understanding may be related to the employment of more deep processes and fewer surface processes (cf. Kardash & Howell, 2000; Windschnitl & André, 1998) .
The current study
The central aim of the present study is to investigate the relation between students' cognitive processing during a modelling task and their epistemological understanding of the task at hand. In particular, we expect that a more sophisticated epistemology of models and modelling will be associated with more deep cognitive processes and less surface cognitive processes during modelling. Therefore, our main research question is:
What is the relation between the level of students' epistemological understanding of models and the process of modelling and the level of their cognitive processing during modelling?
Method

Participants
The study involved twenty-six students from eleventh-grade pre-university education, with a major in science. Their science teachers had confirmed that the students had no prior experience with dynamic modelling or the domain of mechanics. Students' age ranged between 16-18 years. During the modelling task, participants worked in pairs, which were composed by having the students choose their own partners from within a group of familiar students. 
Modelling task
Participants were presented with a task to explore and extend a model of the distance covered by an ice-skater 1 . Since participants had no prior experience with modelling, a completely open modelling task would be too complex for them to be successful within the time constraints of the experiment. Therefore, participants were given an incomplete model as a starting point. Such a model revision task enables the novice modeller to concentrate on trying to comprehend and improve a model without having to start from scratch.
The modelling task was implemented in Powersim® constructor Lite version 2.51, which is freely available for non-commercial use in educational settings (Byrknes & Myrtveit, 1997) . Powersim is a modelling tool based on system dynamics (see Figure 1 ). Participants' task was to extend their model in such a way in that it would provide a good match with the data. Successful completion of the task would require the identification of two friction forces and of a feedback loop which runs from velocity to air resistance. This feedback implies that a skater at a higher velocity experiences more air friction, which consequently leads to a more rapid decrease in velocity.
Data collection
Level of epistemological understanding
An open-ended questionnaire was developed to measure students epistemological understanding of the nature of models, the purpose of models, the design and revision of models, and the evaluation of models. The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was patterned after the work of Grosslight et al. (1991) . The questionnaire was presented directly after the modelling task, which served as a context to frame the questions. Answers of students to the items in our questionnaire were first analysed qualitatively to examine whether they would fit in one of the four following dimensions:
1. Nature of models: How to define a model?
2. Purposes of models: What is the purpose of a model and modelling?
3. Design and revision of models: How are models constructed and when and how are they revised? The answers of every individual student were first interpreted in terms of the dimensions mentioned above. Next, it was investigated within every dimension whether the provided answers could be categorised according to level of sophistication. Each student was given a level of epistemological understanding rating (high, moderate, low) for each of the four dimensions, employing the three levels articulated in the studies of Carey & Smith (1993) and Grosslight et al. (1991;  see Appendix B for scoring and examples). Two independent judges each scored half of the data. Interrater reliability was considered to be acceptable for the present purposes (n = 52, Cohen's kappa = 0.70) (Heuvelmans & Sanders, 1993) .
Cognitive processing
Throughout the modelling task, both students' onscreen actions as well as the verbal communication between them were recorded using the program Lotus ScreenCam. Verbal protocols were obtained by transcribing these recordings. Students' cognitive processing was measured by analyzing these transcripts employing the protocol analysis scheme of Sins et al. (2005) . Although students' verbalizations and behaviours do not fully reveal their covert cognitive processes, the assumption of the present methodology is that the nature of students' discourse and of their actions affords valid indications of the level of their cognitive processing (cf. Hogan & Thomas, 2001 ). The transcripts were scored employing two scoring rubrics that were taken from the scheme of Sins et al. (2005) 2 : a) students' reasoning processes during modelling and b) type of reference made by students during reasoning (see Appendix B for coding scheme).
2 In addition to these two categories, the protocol analysis scheme of Sins et al. (2005) also includes the category: 'topic focus of students' reasoning'. We did not include this code in the present analyses, since reasoning processes coupled with the type of reference students make during process-episodes provide sufficient information concerning students' level of cognitive processing. Reasoning processes such as analysing or explaining mostly involve several turns by both partners in a dyad (Brickell, Ferry, & Harper, 2002) . Therefore, the unit of analysis was determined to be at the episode level, an episode being defined as a period of coherent continuous talk on a single issue. Episodes were segmented on the basis of following noncontent criteria (cf. Chi, 1997) . A new episode would start:
− Following each run of the students' model.
− Following each interval of more than 15 s during which nothing is said.
− At the start and at the end of each experimenter intervention.
− The maximum length for a segment is 1 min. If a segment lasts longer, the segment will be more closely analysed in order to see whether segmentation is possible on the basis of changes in reasoning process or changes in focus (often signalled by words as:
Reasoning episodes in which students are elaborating on the modelling task and connect to their knowledge, which can be either gained from the task at hand or prior knowledge, were designated as deep cognitive processing. Episodes in which students posit unelaborated statements without reference to available knowledge were labelled as surface cognitive processing. The remaining episodes were scored indifferent, and excluded for the purpose of this analysis. The following specific codes were operationalised as indications of deep processing:
− Evaluating with reference to knowledge − Explaining with reference to knowledge − Quantifying with reference to knowledge − Inductive reasoning with reference to knowledge − Analyzing with reference to knowledge
The following codes indicated surface processing: Since the relation between epistemological understanding and cognitive processing was scored at the individual level, while students' cognitive processing had to assessed in a collaborative setting, we counted the numbers of utterances that individual students contributed to the different types of process episodes as an indicator of individual processing.
Because the total numbers of utterances differ across individuals, reporting frequencies would result in a skewed image. Therefore, for each individual student within a dyad, the amounts of deep and surface processes were expressed as proportion of total number of utterances by that student.
Interrater reliability for these codes was determined by comparing the ratings of two independent judges (n = 212; Cohen's kappa = 0.75). This interrater reliability can be regarded as satisfactory for the present purposes (Heuvelmans & Sanders, 1993) .
Procedure
In order to get acquainted with system dynamics modelling in Powersim, each student individually worked through a tutorial 3 . In this tutorial, students were presented with an example model of a water tank. This system provides a very simple example to illustrate fundamental aspects of modelling and the behaviour of dynamic systems is that of a water tank containing a faucet and a drain. The volume of water in the water tank is represented by the stock variable (i.e. reservoir variable), and the flows represent respectively the inflow of water into the water tank through the faucet and the outflow of water from the water tank through a sink. Also, students could execute and revise parts of the water tank model in the Powersim environment. The instruction took about one hour. Subsequently, participants were grouped in dyads. Participants were informed that they were going to explore and subsequently revise models working in couples. Next, dyads read the modelling task and were presented with the initial model version and with the data. Dyads were asked to collaboratively revise the model for approximately one and a half hour. Finally, students completed the epistemology questionnaire. Table 1 shows the mean percentages with examples of the deep and surface cognitive processes students employed during modelling. It becomes apparent from Table 1 that, on average, the students employed much more surface processes compared to deep processes.
Results
Cognitive processing
Most surface processes involve students' quantifying their model without referring to knowledge, whereas for deep processes, the process that is employed the most is students' quantifying with reference to knowledge. The processes explaining with reference to knowledge and analyzing with reference to knowledge, occur only rarely (see Table 1 ).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Level of epistemological understanding
Based on their answers on the questionnaire, students got graded as Level 1, 2 or 3 on each of the four dimensions of epistemological understanding. As shown in Table 2 , on three of the four dimensions more than half of the students reached a Level 2 epistemological understanding. On the dimension Purposes of models 46% of the students reached Level 2 and 42% of the students reached a Level 3 epistemological understanding. Internal 
Relation between epistemological understanding and cognitive processing
To investigate the extent to which students' epistemological understanding of models and modelling is related to their level of processing, we computed the correlation between both To corroborate the quantitative results presented above, we provide an exploratory qualitative analysis of the relationship between students' answers on the epistemology questionnaire, and their reasoning during modelling.
First, we will consider Roel, who expressed a preference for simple models:
'By using very simple models, you may use them for multiple purposes' (Roel; Epistemology score: Level 3, Process of modelling) In this episode both of the epistemological views presented above are enacted: whereas Denise focuses on the graph in lines 1, 2, 4 and 7 and even conflates empirical data with model output in line 6, is Astrid engaged in fitting the model with the data as exemplified in line 8.
Overall, students scoring low on epistemological understanding employed mainly surface processes in which reasoning was restricted to the model at hand instead of being focused on attempting to comprehend the phenomenon modelled.
Conclusion and Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between the students' cognitive processing during computer modelling (i.e. deep versus surface processing), and their epistemological understanding. The assessment of epistemological understanding was framed within the task at hand, because students' epistemologies are supposed to be contextbound. We expected that students with a more sophisticated epistemological understanding would engage more in deep processing, whereas students with a poor epistemological understanding would mainly stick to surface processing.
Findings indicate that, on average, students' epistemological understanding of computer models and the process of modelling was about Level 2. In comparison to studies with similar students reported in the literature, the students in our sample seem to hold relatively advanced epistemological viewpoints. An explanation for this finding may be come from the assessment modelling task, but this task was highly constrained, in the sense that students were asked to chose among three (or four) computer-modelling rules the one that most closely resembled their own mental model.
With respect to the relation between the students' epistemological understanding of models and the process of modelling and their cognitive processing, we found significant and substantial correlations between epistemological understanding and deep processing (positive), and between epistemological understanding and surface processes (negative).
Exploratory qualitative analysis of protocols of the groups scoring low versus high on epistemological understanding corroborated the quantitative analyses, in that students' epistemological stances were enacted in their reasoning. For instance, the finding that students who are high on epistemology refer to prior knowledge during modelling seemed to be related to the epistemological stance that one's own understanding of the phenomenon is useful in constructing the model. This may indicate that these students conceptualized a model as an idea portrayed, and that in order to improve their model it needs elaborate thinking based on their own understanding. Students expressing poor epistemological understanding of models, in contrast, resorted to mainly employing surface processes in which they focused on visual aspects of their model, were engaged in model fitting behaviour and even confused model output with empirical data. The protocols of these students reflected an epistemological stance which regards models as the reality being portrayed, instead of as tools to comprehend the phenomenon modelled. As a limitation of the study, it should first be noted that students' epistemological understanding was assessed after the task, in order to get a more valid and contextualised portrayal of their ideas. The obvious disadvantage would be that the students might have changed their epistemological understanding as a consequence of working on the task, and that the causal direction of the relation we found could be either way. However, as we had no specific epistemological instruction, and as the duration of the task was quite limited, we regard it more likely that students' epistemological understanding affected their processing, than the other way round. In a follow up study the assessment of epistemological understanding could precede the assessment of cognitive processing, if we would introduce an extra modelling task preceding the current one, to provide a proper context for the epistemology assessment.
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